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The prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence to charge and convict
has not been sufficiently examined. Courts and commentators critiquing
abuses of scientific evidence in criminal cases rarely focus on the
prosecutor's role in the process. Issues typically discussed are the
questionable nature of the evidence, the controversial manner in which
the evidence was acquired and tested, whether the expert arrived at her
conclusions in a scientifically reliable manner, and whether the expert's
courtroom testimony was false or misleading. The prosecutor's control
over and manipulation of the scientific evidence to shape the factfinder's evaluation of the facts and to persuade the fact-finder of the
defendant's guilt usually escapes scrutiny.
One well known exception is the case of Miller v. Pate,' a
prosecution for the brutal sexual attack and murder of an eight-year-old
girl. The United States Supreme Court condemned as a violation of due
process the Illinois prosecutor's conduct in introducing proof and
arguing to the jury that a pair of men's under-shorts, allegedly worn by
the defendant and found near the crime scene, were stained with the
victim's blood. The prosecutor elicited this proof through the testimony
of a chemist from the State Bureau of Crime Identification, and then
argued emphatically to the jury:
Those shorts were found in the Van Buren Flats, with blood.
What type of blood? Not '0' blood as the defendant has, but
'A'-type 'A'. . . . And if you will recall, it has never been
contradicted the blood type of Janice May was blood type 'A'
positive. Blood type 'A.' Blood type 'A' on these shorts. It

* Professor of Law, Pace Law School; New York University School of Law, J.D.;
Princeton University, B.A.
1 . 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
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wasn't '0' type as the defendant has. It is 'A' type, what the
little girl had.2
However, at a habeas corpus hearing more than ten years later, a
chemical microanalyst testified that the stains on the shorts were not
blood, but paint, and that the trial prosecutor, although he knew this,
consistently and repeatedly misrepresented the shorts as "a garment
heavily stained with blood."'
Miller highlights an overarching precept in criminal litigation: the
prosecutor dominates the system, has exclusive control of the evidence,
and decides by himself how that evidence will be used.4 If a prosecutor
uses the evidence responsibly, the verdict is trusted and the public's
confidence in the adjudicative process is enhanced. If a prosecutor uses
the evidence irresponsibly, as in Miller, the verdict is suspect, and the
public's confidence in the adjudicative process is eroded. Clearly, if a
prosecutor bent on winning at all costs is able to manipulate technical
and seemingly objective "scientific" evidence, how much more likely is
it that the prosecutor will be able to misuse more subjective and easily
manipulated non-scientific evidence such as confessions to police,
eyewitness identifications, and the testimony of informants, accomplices,
and jailhouse "snitches?'
Concern over a prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence is
underscored by the recent documentation of wrongful convictions,
particularly in death penalty cases, and heightened public awareness that
the justice system errs, often with tragic result^.^ Many, if not most, of
2 . Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 6 ("The record of the petitioner's trial reflects the prosecution's consistent

and repeated misrepresentation that People's Exhibit 3 was, indeed, 'a garment heavily
stained with blood."').
4 . See YALEKAMISAR,ET AL., MODERNCRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
1 178 (I 0th ed. 2002)
(describing prosecutor's domination of the criminal justice system, including
investigative manpower of police, investigative legal authority of grand jury and grand
jury's subpoena power, early anival on scene by police when evidence is fresh, and
natural inclination of witnesses to cooperate with police and refuse to cooperate with
defense).
5 . See JIMDWYER,ET AL.,
ACTUALINNOCENCE(2000) (providing a compendium of
anecdotal accounts and legal and social science scholarship of miscarriages of justice in
American criminal trials); JAMES
LIEBMAN,
ET AL., A BROKEN
SYSTEM:
ERRORRATESIN
CAPITAL~ASES,
1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (conducting a massive study of every capital case
in the U.S. between 1973-1995 documenting that the overall error rate in capital
punishment system is sixty-eight percent, and that eighty-two percent of all capital
judgments reversed on appeal [247 out of 3011 were replaced on retrial with a sentence
less than death, or no sentence at all); Richard C. Dieter Innocer~ceand the Death
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these wrongful convictions are attributable to scientific evidence
presented by prosecutors as trustworthy, and relied on as such by juries,
when in fact the evidence was erroneous or fra~dulent.~
Prosecutors in
many of these cases have concealed from the defense evidence that
would have discredited the prosecutor's case,' distorted evidence by
eliciting from experts opinions that were either fraudulent or misleading,'
and subverted the fact-finding process by making arguments to the jury
that were false, misleading, and inflarnmat~ry.~
A prosecutor's courtroom conduct is circumscribed by several legal
and ethical constraints. A prosecuting attorney occupies two distinct but
simultaneous roles in the criminal justice system-an adversarial role
and a quasi-judicial role. A prosecutor in her adversarial role is the
attorney for the government and may vigorously seek to convict persons
charged with crimes. A prosecutor in her quasi-judicial role, however,
has a different mission, namely, a constitutional and ethical duty not
merely to win a conviction, but also to seek justice.'' The prosecutor's
role as a "minister of justice" includes preeminently a duty to seek the
truth." The duty to seek the truth derives from several sources: first, the
Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, at http:Nwww.deathpenaltyinfo.org (July
1997) (listing 107 exonerated inmates released from Death Row since 1973).
6. See Stanley Feldman, et al., Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous
Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ.ST. L.J. 665,698 (2002) (claiming that forensic evidence that is
fraudulent or erroneous "has been found to be one of the major causes, and perhaps the
ET AL., supra note
leading cause, of erroneous convictions of innocent persons."); DWYER
5, at 263 (false and erroneous forensic evidence, including microscopic hair comparisons,
serology inclusions, and other forensic inclusions, the leading cause of wrongful
convictions).
7 . See infra notes 16-56 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 57-106 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 107-127 and accompanying text.
10. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor's] interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."). See also MODEL
RULESOFPROF'L.CONDUCT
R. 3.8, cmt. 1 (1993) [hereinafter
MODELRULES] ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate."); MODEL
CODEOF PROF'L.RESPONSIBlLlTY EC 7- 13 (198 1)
[hereinafter MODEL
CODE]("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of
the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); ABA STANDARDS
2~ DEF. FUNCTION
§ 3-1.2(c), The
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE:PROSECUTION
FUNCTION
Prosecution Function, standard 3-1.2 (c) (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA
PROSECUTION
STANDARDS]
(''The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not rTIerely to
convict."); NAT.'L PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
5 1.1 (2d ed. 1991) ("The primary
responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished.").
I I . See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) ("The State's obligation is not to
convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges") (Fortas, J., concuning);
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prosecutor's obligation under due process not to use false evidence or to
suppress evidence materially favorable to the defendant;12 second, the
prosecutor's ethical obligation to have confidence in the truth of the
evidence before bringing criminal charges;13 third, the prosecutor's
virtual monopoly of the evidence and domination of the fact-finding
14
. process;
and fourth, the prosecutor's unique power to affect the
evaluation of the facts by the fact-finder who views the prosecutor as an
expert who can be trusted to use the facts responsibly.15
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Duke, 50
F.3d 571, 578 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994) (prosecutor has "duty to serve and facilitate the truthfinding function of the courts"); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1548 n.15 (I lth Cir. 1994)
("prosecutors have a special duty of integrity in their arguments"); United States v.
Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) ("lawyers representing the government in
criminal cases serve truth and justice first"); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162
n.10 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead") (quoting United
States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1962)); Walker v. City of New York, 974
F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (prosecutor has "duty not to lie"). See also Bennett L.
309 (2001).
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 CEO.J . LEGALETHICS
12. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
13. See MODELRULES,supra note 10, at R. 3.8(a) ("The prosecutor is a criminal case
shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor~knowsis not supported by
probable cause"); MODELCODE,supra note 10, at DR 7-103(A) ("A public prosecutor or
other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges
when he or she knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable
cause."); ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note 10, 5 3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor
should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of
criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by
probable cause.").
14. See KAMISAR,
ET AL., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("prosecutor's opinion
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence"); Berger, 295 U.S. at
88.
It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence
that these obligations [to serve justice], which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions,
insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry
much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none.

Id.
The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the United States Government;
he stands before the jury as the community's representative. His remarks are
those, not simply of an advocate, but rather of a federal official duty-bound to
see that justice is done . . . . [I]t may be difficult for [the jury] to ignore his
views, however biased and baseless they may in fact be.
United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1 173, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1981).
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The following sections focus on the various ways that prosecutors
misuse scientific evidence. The opportunity for misconduct is present in
each of three principal stages of a trial: (1) pre-trial proceedings
involving disclosure and discovery of scientific evidence, (2) questioning
scientific forensic experts and introducing into evidence scientific
exhibits, and (3) closing argument to the jury.

One of the principal techniques employed by prosecutors to obstruct
accurate fact-finding is to conceal, or disclose too late for effective use,
evidence that legally and ethically is required to be dis~losed.'~
The
prosecutor's suppression of evidence is one of the principal causes of
wrongful convictions.17Rules regulating disclosure apply generally to all
types of evidence. However, disclosure obligations are especially
important with respect to scientific evidence. Whereas other types of
evidence such as a defendant's confession, an eyewitness's
identification, or an accomplice's testimony are familiar modes of proof
and readily capable of being discredited by a skilled defense attorney,
scientific evidence, by contrast, is often highly technical and complex,
even to an experienced defense attorney. Special rules are necessary
with respect to the scientific data, expert reports, and the expert's
prospective testimony. Scientific evidence usually requires extensive
pre-trial investigation, analysis, and testing, typically by an expert hired
by the defense. Moreover, because of early access to crime scenes and
superior investigative and forensic resources, prosecutors usually have
exclusive knowledge and control of the scientific evidence; thus, they
can determine the extent and timing of disclosure.18

16. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV.693, 694 (1987) ("[wlhenever a prosecutor
suppresses exculpatory evidence or presents false evidence, these actions cast doubt on
the integrity of our legal system and the accuracy of the determinations of guilt and

17. See LIEBMAN
et al., supra note 5, at 5 (noting that prosecutorial suppression of
evidence accounted for sixteen percent to nineteen percent of reversible errors); Ken
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win,
CHIC.TRIB.,Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (reporting that convictions in 381 homicide cases
nationwide have been reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting the
defendants' innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false).
18. See KAMISAR,
ET AL., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Given the complex nature of scientific evidence and the
acknowledged adversarial imbalance between prosecution and defense,I9
discovery statutes, as well as ethics rules, require a prosecutor to disclose
to the defense well in advance of trial test results, reports, and statements
of scientific forensic experts that the prosecutor intends to use as
evidence or that are relevant to pre-trial preparation by the defense.20A
prosecutor also has a statutory and ethical duty to furnish the defense
with samples of the scientific evidence to allow the defense to conduct
independent tests.21In addition, the prosecutor has an ethical duty to
comply with these discovery requirements in a timely manner to allow
sufficient time for pre-trial preparation by the defense.22 Apart from
discovery that is regulated by statutes, a prosecutor also has a
constitutional and ethical duty to disclose to the defense favorable
evidence that is material to guilt,23or tends to negate guilt.24
Violations by a prosecutor of these disclosure obligations can result
in a "trial by ambush."25 Violations include the suppression of scientific
evidence that the prosecutor believes will, if disclosed, harm his chances
for a c o n ~ i c t i o nnondisclosure
;~~
of evidence that the prosecutor believes
will, if disclosed, impeach the credibility of his expert;27 and
nondisclosure or untimely disclosure of scientific evidence that is
--

19. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALEL. J. 1 149 ( 1960).
20. See, e.g., FED.R. CRIM.
P. 16(a)(l)(D);ABA STANDARDS
FORCRIMINAL
JUSTICE:
AND TRIAL
BY JURY9 1 1-2.l (iv) (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ABA DISCOVERY
DISCOVERY
STANDARDS].
21. See, e.g., FED.R. CRIM.
P. 16(a)(l)(C); ABA DISCOVERY
STANDARDS,
supra note
20, Q: 1 1-2. I (v).
22. See ABA DISCOVERY
STANDARDS,
supra note 20, Q: I 1-4.l (a).
23. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
24. See MODELRULES,
supra note 10, at R. 3.8(d); MODELCODE,supra note 10, at
EC 7-13(3); ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note 10,Q:3-3.11.
25. Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (forensic chemist's
untimely and incomplete disclosure of critical piece of evidence resulted in "trial by
ambush"); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (forensic
chemist's untimely disclosure of an "incomplete," "inaccurate," and "misleading" report
resulted in a "trial by ambush").
26. See Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (1 l t h Cir. 1986) (ballistics evidence);
United States ex re/. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952) (ballistics evidence);
Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (ballistics report).
27. See Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 1999).
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statutorily and judicially required to be discl~sed.'~Two cases from
Oklahoma illustrate the prosecutor's violation of these requirements. In
Mitchell v. ~ i b s o n , ~the
' Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated a
death sentence imposed by an Oklahoma jury, finding that the
defendant's right to due process was violated by the prosecutor's failure
to disclose evidence showing that the testimony of the prosecution's
forensic chemist, Joyce Gilchrist, was false. The victim had been beaten
and sexually assaulted. Gilchrist, employed by the Oklahoma City
Police Department, testified that she found sperm on swabs taken from
the victim that were consistent with the defendant's sperm. She also
testified that blood, semen, and sperm found on the sheet in which the
victim's body had been transported from the crime scene were consistent
with the defendant's, as were semen stains on the victim's panties.'0
Gilchrist's testimony, according to the federal district judge who
reviewed the defendant's habeas corpus petition, was "without question,
untrue."" During the habeas corpus hearing, held more than ten years
after the trial, the defense learned for the first time about hand-written
notes taken by Gilchrist during telephone conversations with an FBI
agent, to whom samples had been sent for further scientific testing. After
conducting two DNA probes, the FBI agent reported to Gilchrist that
none of the semen matched the defendant's and further alerted Gilchrist
that one of her own tests, in fact, excluded the defendant. The prosecutor
nevertheless concealed from the defense the test results developed by the
FBI, as well as the notes taken by Gilchrist indicating that the defendant
had been excluded by the FBI's DNA tests. The prosecutor's "blatant
withholding of unquestionably exculpatory evidence," according to the
federal court, is "absolutely indefensible."" Moreover, the prosecutor
compounded this misconduct by "labor[ing] extensively at trial to
obscure the true DNA test results and to highlight Gilchrist's test
The second case involves the prosecution of Jeffrey Pierce, who was
convicted by an Oklahoma jury in 1986 of rape and sodomy and
sentenced to fifty-four years in prison." Pierce had a clean record, alibi
28. See Miller, 809 P.2d at 1317; Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Crirn. App.
1990); M c C u q , 765 P.2d at 12 15.
29. 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001).
30. Id. at 1063.
3 1 . Id. at 1060.
32. Id.

33. Id. at 1064.
34.

Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1255 (Okla. Crirn. App. 1990).
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witnesses, and character references. The eyewitness identification by the
victim was weak." The testimony of the police chemist, again Joyce
Gilchrist, provided evidence crucial to Pierce's conviction. Gilchrist
testified that she microscopically identified pubic hairs from the victim's
pubic hair combings and on the victim's skirt, as well as head hairs on
items submitted by the victim, and that the hairs were "consistent" with
Pierce's, and, indeed, "positively" identified him.j6 The prosecutor
bolstered Gilchrist's testimony by eliciting from her the highly improper
comment that "in the years during which she had been involved with hair
analysis, she had never seen hair from different people that were
microscopically similar in all characteristic^."^'
Pierce was innocent, as independent DNA tests conducted by the FBI
fifteen years later would prove." According to the FBI report, prepared
following official allegations of misconduct by Gilchrist, the hair
associations used by Gilchrest to convict Pierce, and the conclusions she
reached, were erroneous.39 Pierce was released in 2001 after spending
fifteen years in prison. The decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals ten years earlier upholding Pierce's conviction, in retrospect,
seems sadly misguided. The court rejected several defense claims
involving disclosure violations by the prosecutor relating to Gilchrist's
testimony. First, the court found that the prosecutor and Gilchrist
violated a court order to send the scientific evidence to a laboratory for
independent testing by defense experts.40 The crucial hair evidence was
not sent out for testing, Gilchrist claimed, because she did not think the
laboratory designated by the defense tested hair. This was not the first
time that Gilchrist had deliberately violated a judge's discovery order.41
35. Id. at 1258-59. During the investigation, the victim identified two different
people as looking similar to the attacker. Id. at 1258 n.6. In addition, after a police
detective showed the victim "better photographs" of other suspects, "she still thought it
resembled the [other] suspect a lot." Id. at 1259.
36. Under the Microscope, at http:Nwww.cbsnews.com (July 24, 2002).
37. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1265. See also DAVID
L.FAIGMAN,
ET AL., SCIENCE
IN THE
SCIENCE
ISSUES16-17 (2002) (by invoking "years of experience," expert
LAW- FORENSIC
witness reinforces opinion and prevents effective cross-examination).
38. Paul Duggan, Oklahoma Reviews 3,000 Convictions; Police Chemist's Work on
Cuses, Including I I That Led to Executions, Is Questioned, WASH.POST,May 9, 200 1, at
A2.
39. See U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE,FEDERALBUREAUOF INVESTIGATION,
Sumtnary of Case Reviews of Forensic Chemist, Joyce Gilchrist, Okluhonla City Police
Luborutory at 3 (April 4, 2001).
40. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1261-62.
41. See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); McCarty v. State,
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The discovery violation in Pierce v. State, although clear error, was not
reversible error, according to the court, because the defense was found to
be partly to blame for failing to notify the prosecutor when it learned that
the order had been violated:42 The hair evidence-the most critical
evidence in the case-was never subjected to independent review.
Second, Gilchrist's reports on bodily fluids recovered from the
victim contained only raw data. Her reports did not contain the specific
conclusions about which she would testify at trial, for example, that the
rapist belonged to blood group "H" and was a non-secretor, an opinion
that supported Pier~e."~
In fact, the same Oklahoma appeals court had
reversed an earlier conviction involving the same allegation, i.e., that
Gilchrist's report contained insufficient information as to her findings
and conclusions.44 In reversing that earlier case, the appellate court
found Gilchrist's report was "at best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate
and mi~leading."~~
In Pierce, however, the court found that Gilchrist's
inclusion of the raw data only was adequate compliance with discovery.
The Court observed, "Although justice is certainly better served when a
defendant is provided with the most detailed information possible,"
nothing more than was provided in this case should be "judicially
req~ired."~
Given
~
Gilchrist's earlier disclosure violation, however, the
court's conclusion that the limited amount of information she disclosed
satisfied the prosecutor's discovery obligation is especially troubling. A
prosecutor's incomplete, untimely, and total failure to comply with
discovery obligations is a familiar problem in criminal litigation and is
one that too often is overlooked by courts. For many prosecutors, the
modus operandi of pre-trial practice is to disclose as little and as late as
possible.47 Pierce merely highlights this unfortunate practice in a trial
that produced a tragic result.
Related to a prosecutor's constitutional and ethical disclosure duty is
the duty of a prosecutor to preserve scientific evidence from loss or
destruction. Clearly, absent an affirmative duty to preserve evidence, the
-

-

765 P.2d 121 5 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
42. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 126 1 .
43. See id.
44. McCarty, 765 P.2d at 12 17- 18.
45. Id. at 121 8.
46. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1262-63.
47. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperution with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of
L. REV.917, 961 (1999) (describing
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM
practice of prosecutors in limiting compliance with discovery requirements by finding
safe ways to avoid disclosure).
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disclosure duty can easily be circumvented by suppression of evidence
through destruction rather than mere failure to reveal. And given the
critical role of scientific evidence in exonerating innocent persons, it is
imperative that prosecutors preserve such evidence, at least for the
duration of a defendant's in~arceration.~~
Some laboratories apparently
routinely destroy evidence p r e m a t ~ r e l y . Whether
~~
a remedy exists for
such routine destruction is unclear. Indeed, because of the speculative
nature of unpreserved evidence, the United States Supreme Court has
held that destruction of evidence that might be useful to a defendant
violates due process only if the defendant can show bad faith on the part
of the prosecutor or the police.50 Although proving bad faith is extremely
difficult, it is at least arguable that a laboratory that routinely destroys
evidence prematurely as a matter of office policy engages in bad faith
conduct.
It should be emphasized, if it is not already apparent, that a
prosecutor is vicariously responsible for the misconduct of other officials
working on the case. Thus, a prosecutor's disclaimer of responsibility
for the careless and irresponsible conduct of a forensic laboratory, and
for the fraudulent and incompetent conduct of his scientific expert, is
legally unavailing. A prosecutor is constitutionally obligated under due
process to ascertain whether officials or agents working on the case, such
as police officers and forensic investigators, have engaged in conduct
that impairs the integrity of the evidence, or are concealing evidence that
might be favorable to the defendant.5' Regardless of a prosecutor's legal
responsibility for the misconduct of his agents, a prosecutor's claim of
ignorance of the misconduct often is plainly incredible. Documented
cases of open and notorious misconduct by forensic laboratories and of
rogue experts giving fraudulent testimony strongly suggest that many

48. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) (constitutional duty to
preserve evidence "limited to evidence that might be expected to play significant role in
the suspect's defense").
49. See Memorandum from Bryon Boshell to Oklahoma City Police Dep't.,
Serology/DNA Concerns, Jan. 16, 2001 [hereinafter Boshell] (describing conditions in
Oklahoma City Police Department's serology/DNA laboratory and reporting that "rape
evidence was systematically being destroyed after only two years, long before the statute
of limitations had expired;" Gilchrist "stated she had a letter from District Attorney Bob
Macy authorizing two-year destruction;" Gilchrist also stated in an interview that
"Deputy Chief Wilhelm authorized the two-year destruction policy.").
50. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,58 (1988).
51. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
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prosecutors are fully aware that the laboratory and the expert have been
engaging in a long-standing practice and pattern of m i ~ c o n d u c t . ~ ~
For example, a recent report by the Oklahoma City Police
Department contains a scathing criticism of the chaotic and dishonest
work of the Police Department's forensic laboratory over a period of
many years and particularly, again, the misconduct of G i l ~ h r i s t .The
~~
report describes many instances of missing evidence, flawed operating
and safety procedures, contamination of evidence, premature destruction
of evidence, lack of peer review or other validation procedures, storage
problems, and inadequate procedures for transmitting evidence to and
from the district attorney's office.54 The report also notes several
instances of non-disclosure of evidence, improper forensic testimony,
and criticism of Gilchrist's work by forensic scientific peer
Given these mostly uncontested allegations of misconduct by
Gilchrist and the Oklahoma police laboratory that were ongoing for
many years, and the numerous court decisions expressly critical of
Gilchrist's work, it is inconceivable that a district attorney's office that
routinely used and relied on Gilchrist to win convictions was unaware of
her systematic and pervasive misconduct. Ignorance is never a legal
excuse when a person deliberately avoids learning about facts and
circumstances that are readily discoverable because he wishes to remain
ign~rant.'~The well-known criminal law doctrine known as "willful
blindness" should apply equally to a prosecutor who regularly uses a
scientific expert who is notorious for incompetence and dishonesty.
Paradoxically, not only were the Oklahoma City prosecutors and police
not critical of Gilchrist's work, they praised her work. She was awarded
the Police Department's "Employee of the Year,"" and was given an
honorary citation by the Police Department and a commendation from

52. See, e.g., In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501,
503-04 (1993) (investigative report of misconduct in the West Virginia State Police
Crime Laboratory describes serologist Fred Zain's "long history of falsifying evidence in
criminal prosecutions," his longstanding "pattern and practice of misconduct," criticism
of his work by Accreditation Board of the ~ m e r i c a nSociety of Crime Laboratory
Directors, and the fact that "Zain's supervisors may have ignored or concealed
complaints of his misconduct").
5 3 . See Boshell, supra note 49.
54. See id.

55. See id.
ET AL., supra note 4, at 232.
56. See KAMISAR,
57. Under the Microscope, supra note 36.
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the District Attorney for her "skillful work in the careful analysis of
forensic evidence" in the Jeffrey Pierce case."
Finally, nondisclosure, or incomplete or untimely disclosure, is often
aggravated by the inability of a defendant to challenge effectively the
scientific evidence that the prosecutor presents to the jury. Imbalance in
the adversarial process between prosecution and defense is exacerbated
by an indigent defendant's inability to retain his own scientific expert. A
responsible commitment to adversarial justice reasonably requires a
prosecutor to support, or at least not to oppose, an indigent defendant's
request for expert assistance, particularly when scientific evidence will
play a significant role in his trial and any resulting error found harmless
on appeal. Given the speculative and imprecise nature of many types of
scientific evidence, it is untenable for prosecutors to maintain, as they
have done, that cross-examination by defense counsel is an adequate
substitute for a defense expert.59

A prosecutor's courtroom conduct is hedged by various
constitutional and ethical proscriptions. A prosecutor is forbidden to
present false,60misleading:' inflarnmat~ry:~or inadmissible evidence.63
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384, 395-96 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).

But see Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999) (denial of expert
'
assistance to rebut testimony of Gilchrist regarding hair, fiber, and semen samples did not
result in fundamentally unfair trial).
60. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (false testimony about promise
of leniency by key witness); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (false evidence that shorts
linked to defendant stained with blood); ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note lo,$
3-5.6(a) ("prosecutor should not knowingly offer false evidence"). See also B E N N E
L. ~
GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
$ 10:27 (2d ed. 2002).
61. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (violation of due process to elicit
defendant's silence following arrest to infer guilt); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315
(9th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor falsely suggests that key figure could not be called as
witness); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n.10 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the prosecutor
has a special duty not to mislead") (quoting United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365,
367 (2d Cir. 1962). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 60, at 9 10:2 (character
assassination), $ 10: 13 (misuse of defendant's silence), 9 10:20 (asking questions without
factual basis), 9 10:21 (misusing polygraph evidence).
62. See United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135 (7th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor permits
containers containing marijuana to remain open and emit odor of m a r i j ~ a n a ~ d u r i n ~
defendant's case-in-chief despite defendant's request to close them); People v. Blue, 724
N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 2000) (prosecutor displays before jury on a mannequin the bloodied and
brain-splattered uniform of murdered police officer); ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
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A prosecutor may not mislead the jury or misstate the fact^.^“

A
prosecutor may not bolster her witness's credibility.65 These general
prohibitions apply with added force when a prosecutor presents the
testimony of a scientific expert because the jury ordinarily views such
experts with heightened respect and gives considerable weight to their
opinions. Familiar types of misconduct by prosecutors include eliciting
fraudulent expert testimony, eliciting erroneous and prejudicial
conclusions without any factual basis, eliciting testimony that appears to
be based on a valid scientific theory but is merely the expert's
speculation and conjecture, attempting to bolster the expert's credibility
by overstating and misusing the witness's background and experience,
and giving personal assurances to the jury that the witness is credible and
reliable.66
A prosecutor starts with several distinct advantages when she puts
her scientific expert on the stand. First, in contrast with other types of
witnesses, the expert usually is viewed by the jury with an "aura of
special reliability and trustw~rthiness."~~
Second, the expert typically
possesses impressive credentials, which the prosecutor meticulously
elicits and that reinforce the jury's confidence in the witness's opinion.
Third, the expert usually is adept at testifying, and communicates her
theory and conclusions articulately, persuasively, and in language that
lay jurors can understand. Fourth, the expert's conclusions almost
always interlock with other evidence in the case and corroborate the
prosecution's theory of guilt. The expert, more than any other witness
supra note 10, 5 3-5.6 (c) ("a prosecutor should not permit any tangible evidence to be
displayed in the view of the judge or jury which would tend to prejudice fair
consideration . . . of such evidence"). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 60, at $ 10:33.
63. See ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note 10, $ 3-5.6(b) ("a prosecutor
should not knowingly . . . offer inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable
questions, or make other impermissible comments or arguments in presence of the judge
supra note 60, at $10: 19.
or jury). See also GERSHMAN,
64. GERSHMAN,
supra note 60, at 5 11:27.
65. Id. at $10:25.
66. Scientific witnesses typically testify under either of two different standards.
Under the Frye standard, an expert must be able to establish that the scientific principle
has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." See Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Daubert standard, an
expert must be able to demonstrate that the scientific evidence is reliable, i.e., that the
reasoning or methodology underlying the expert's testimony is scientifically valid, and
that the reasoning or methodology properly applies to the facts of the given case. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). See also PAULC.
GIANNELLI,
ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
EVIDENCE
300-03 (2003).
67. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1 152 (9th Cir. 1973).
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who testifies in a U.S. courtroom, possesses the greatest capacity to
mislead the jury. In tandem with a prosecutor who zealously seeks a
conviction, the expert often single-handedly can secure that conviction.
It is well known that prosecutors, deliberately or unwittingly, have
introduced fraudulent and erroneous scientific evidence. Such evidence
has included faked fingerprints planted at the crime scene or placed on
evidence linked to the
faked autopsies in death penalty
cases:'
fabricated breathalyzer readings in intoxicated driving casesJO
and perjured testimony by experts making hair and blood comparison^.^'
Prosecutors have also presented as trustworthy the testimony of scientific
experts that contained false, exaggerated, and erroneous conclusions that
lacked any scientific basis. The records of contemporary criminal trials
are replete with instances of so-called 'tjunk science" finding its way into
courtrooms, and championed by prosecutors to win conviction^.^^ Some
of these scientific experts are infamous: Fred Zain, a s e r ~ l o g i s tRalph
;~~
Erdmann, a p a t h ~ l o g i s t Michael
;~~
West, a forensic dentist;75and Louise
Robbins, a foot expert.76 Other forensic scientific renegades include
Joyce G i l ~ h r i s tJoan
, ~ ~ Wood, 78ArnoldM e l n i k ~ f f ?and
~ Elliot Gross.80
The relationship between the prosecutor and her expert witness has
not been adequately studied. Because of the secretive nature of pre-trial
preparation, the extent to which a prosecutor and her expert cooperate in
68. See Former State Trooper Explains Ways He Fabricated Evidence, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 1993, at B5.
69. See Robert Suro, Ripples of a Pathologist's Misconduct In Graves and Courts of
West Texas, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 22, 1992, at 22.
70. See State v. Gookins, 637 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1994).
71. See In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501 (W.
Va. 1993).
72. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The
Need for Independent Crime Lrrboratories, 4 VA. J . SOC.POL'Y & L. 439 (1997)
(accounts of widespread abuses by forensic scientific experts).
73. Id. at 442-49.
74. Id. at 449-53.
75. Id. at 453-57.
76. Id. at 457-62.
77. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
TRIB.,May 3, 2002,
78. See A Shocking Blunder Leads to False Accusation, TAMPA
at 2.
79. See Adam Liptak, States to Review Lrrb Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y.
TIMES,Dec. 19, 2002, at A24.
80. See Andrew Jacobs & Marc Santora, New Report in Wife's Death Clears Former
Police Oflcer, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 5, 2002, at Bl. See also Gross v. N. Y. Times Co. et al.,
623 N.E.2d 1 163 (N.Y. 1993).
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shaping, polishing, and even manufacturing the witness's testimony is
virtually impossible to p r ~ v e . ~ 'Given the symbiotic nature of the
relationship, however, it is almost certain that scripting and coaching
occur. To be sure, ethical rules admonish prosecutors to respect the
independence of the expert and avoid attempting to manipulate the
expert's opinion.82 Properly trained forensic scientists are ethically
required to remain independent and avoid being manipulated to give
opinions that are not truthful and lack scientific validity.83 It is
intuitively obvious, however, that the relationship between some
prosecutors and their experts is mutually reinforcing not in the service of
truth but of obtaining convictions. According to an influential treatise on
forensic science, "clients," and this includes prosecutors, "want good
science and the truth if it will help their case. If good science and the
truth will not help their case, they will willingly settle for poor science
and something less than the absolute
It is commonly known that
many forensic experts display a pro-prosecution bias, particularly, but
not always, by experts employed by law enforcement agen~ies.~'Many
of these experts are notorious for manufacturing testimony to fit the
prosecutor's theory of
By the same token, prosecutors routinely
seek out experts who will support the prosecution's theory and reject
experts who might display more independence and refuse to provide the
prosecutor with the opinion he wants.87 According to the former District
Attorney of Oklahoma County, "An expert who won't give you an
opinion is not a whole lot of value to
81. See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching By Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO
L.
REV.829 (2002).
82. See ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note 10, 5 3-3.3 ("a prosecutor should
respect the independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of the
expert's opinion on the subject").
83. See FAIGMAN
ET AL., supra note 37, at 98 (suggesting that normative ideal for
experts is to present that field's knowledge and not distorted version to serve narrow
partisan purpose).
84. Id. at 4.
85. Giannelli, supra note 72, at 441 ("Too many experts in the criminal justice
system manifest a police-prosecution bias, a willingness to shade or distort opinions to
support the state's case.").
86. Id. (describing the conduct of some of the most infamous so-called "experts").
87. Id. at 441, 448 (noting that "too many prosecutors seek out such experts")
(prosecutors in West Virginia sought out Fred Zain, a serologist widely discredited for his
long history of falsifying evidence, even after he left the state to obtain a position in
another state, because West Virginia prosecutors believed that West Virginia serologists
could not reach the "right" results).
88. McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 12 19 n. l (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (District
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Cases abound of prosecutors eliciting erroneous and blatantly
unscientific opinions. For example, testimony of hair comparisons by
Arnold Melnikoff, a forensic scientist and former director of Montana's
state crime laboratory, led to the conviction of Jimmy Ray Bromgard in
1987 for rape. Bromgard was innocent, cleared by DNA evidence after
spending fifteen years in jaiLX9 Although hair comparison is recognized
as one of the most "miserable" types of forensic evidence:' Melnikoff
testified at Bromgard's trial that head and pubic hairs found at the scene
of the rape were indistinguishable from those of the defendant.
Melnikoff testified that the chances that either set of hairs found at the
scene were not those of the defendant were 1 in 100. He then stated that
since head and pubic hairs look different, "it's a multiplying effect, it
would be 1 chance in 10,000."9' Melnikoff's 1 in 100 estimate, as any
responsible prosecutor and scientist knows, is without any scientific
basis. Melnikoff's further multiplying of probabilities was so ridiculous,
and so beyond scientific capabilities, as to suggest that the witness, with
the prosecutor's acquiescence and assistance, made a conscious effort to
obtain a conviction based on manufactured testimony.
Similar examples reveal deliberate attempts by prosecutors to elicit
opinions that any experienced prosecutor knows are erroneous,
unscientific, and implausible. One expert, again Gilchrist, in response to
the prosecutor's question whether she had an opinion as to whether the
defendant was present during the commission of the crime, gave this
astonishing reply: "[Hle [defendant] was in fact there."92
Notwithstanding the notorious weakness of hair comparison evidencey3
prosecutors have elicited improper opinions that microscopic hair
Attorney, during interview with newspaper reporter, stated that he wanted experts to give
opinion that defendant was "actually in fact [at scene of crime] and in contact with the
victim").
89. Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lub Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y.
T I M E S , Dec. 19, 2002, at A24.
90. See FAICMAN
ET AL., supra note 37, at 35. See also infra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text.
91. Liptak, supra note 89.
92. See McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 12 18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (according
to the appellate court, "We find it inconceivable why Ms. Gilchrist would give such an
improper opinion").
93. See FAICMAN
ET AL., supra note 37, at 35 ("hair is a miserable form of
evidence"); DWYERET AL., supra note 5, at 162 ("the weakness of [hair evidence] is well
established . . . . [Tlhere was little difference between flipping a coin and getting a hair
analyst to provide reliable results."). See also infra notes 125-128 and accompanying
text.
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comparisons from different people "were [never] microscopically similar
in all characteristic^,'"^ contained "unique characteristics" that the expert
had never seen before,g5 and that hair comparisons proved that the
defendants "were in contact with [the victim] prior to death."96
Prosecutors have elicited other incredible opinions from reckless and
irresponsible experts, for example, that a knife blade "indeed and without
doubt" caused the victim's wound^,^' and that the odds were
"astronomical" that another person with the defendant's foot features
was at the crime scene.98
Prosecutors compound such unsupportable and implausible opinions
by various techniques that improperly bolster the expert's credibility.
One method is to falsely present the expert as a neutral witness when in
fact the expert has worked closely with the prosecution and manifests an
unmistakable pro-prosecution bias.99 Another technique is to elicit an
opinion that validates another witness's truthfulness explicitly,100or
suggests that the witness is a member of a class of persons who are
trustworthy,lOl or asserts that a victim has in fact been victimized.'02
Another method is to mislead the jury by exaggerating or falsifying the
expert's credentials.Io3 The prosecutor in Pierce, for example, elicited
Gilchrist's extensive qualifications, which included membership in the
influential American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS).Io4 By
parading before the jury these impressive qualifications, the prosecutor is
able to reinforce the jury's confidence in the expert's testimony. But
Gilchrist lied about her credentials, probably with the prosecutor's
knowledge. Her membership in the AAFS had been suspended.
Nevertheless, according to the appellate court, Gilchrist's testimony,
"while potentially misleading, was harmless error in light of her other
ample qualifications as an expert."'" However, as one commentator has
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1265 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 13 17, 13 19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
Fox v. State, 779 P.2d 562,571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
Giannelli, supra note 72, at 454.
Id. at 459.
99. See Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor
violates due process by his "egregious" presentation of expert witness as neutral when in
reality expert participated actively in investigation of defendant for several years).
supra note 60, at 3 10:32.50.
100. See GERSHMAN,
101. Seeid.
102. See id.
103. See Giannelli, supra note 72, at 468 n.175.
104. See Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1264 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
105. Id.
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noted, "If people are willing to lie about something on which it is so easy
to be caught, how common and how damaging to the fact finding process
are misrepresentations about the substance of forensic science.79,106
Prosecutors use other techniques to bolster their experts' testimony,
and at the same time insulate that testimony from being challenged
effectively. One method is to elicit the expert's assertion directly, or to
prepare the expert's answer to questions on cross-examination, that she is
relying for her opinion on her "years of experience.'"'' When the expert
describes a situation as "unusual," "unique," or something that the expert
"has never seen before," such statements have the capacity to immunize
the witness against being refuted. The cross-examiner does not know
what standard the witness is using, what other situations the witness has
encountered, and whether the witness's assertion is contrived. Clearly,
when an expert is asked by the prosecutor or defense counsel to explain
the basis for her opinion, the witness's ability to invoke "years of
experience" undermines the scientific basis for the opinion and thwarts
responsible fact-finding.'''
Prosecutors, assisted by their experts, also inflict so-called
"evidentiary harpoons" during the evidence process to unfairly prejudice
the defendant. Evidentiary harpoons are gratuitous remarks by a witness
that appear to have been deliberately planned to inflict harm. The
remark may have been prearranged, or it may simply be a voluntary
remark made by a biased witness "out of the clear blue sky." Expert
witnesses are adept at inflicting such "harpoons" in response to careless,
ill-prepared questions by defense counsel on cross-examination. Experts
also slip such remarks into their direct testimonies. For example, when
asked by a prosecutor for her opinion with respect to hair comparisons,
the forensic expert, again Gilchrist, replied that scalp hair fragments from
an "afro pick" found at the crime scene were microscopically consistent

106. Michael J. Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science,
34 J. FORENSIC
SCI.772,789 (1989).
107. See FAIGMAN
ET AL., supra note 37, at 16-17.
108. But see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997). The Daubert trilogy requires the expert to establish that their reasoning and
methodology have a scientific basis. Presumably, requiring a valid scientific basis for an
opinion would prevent an expert witness from utilizing his "years of experience" as the
basis for his conclusions. However, assuming that the witness is able to establish
preliminarily some scientific basis for his reasoning and methodology, the witness would
then have the ability to almost completely confound the cross-examiner by alluding to his
years of experience in testing and evaluating numerous similar cases.
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with scalp hairs taken from the same defendant "in another c a ~ e . " ' ~
Although this answer was a flagrant attempt to implicate the defendant in
another crime, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found no error.
According to the court, "it 'stretches the imagination' to suppose the
witness intended to prejudice the appellant by the uttering one time that
the hair samples came from another ~ a s e . " " ~

IV. ARGUMENTTO THE JURY
Closing argument to the jury is an opportunity for a prosecutor to
assimilate and distill the proof in an orderly and logical fashion in order
to persuade the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable
doubt. Closing argument is also an opportunity for a prosecutor bent on
winning at all costs, as in Miller v. Pate,"' to "strike foul blow^].""^
When courts criticize prosecutors for misconduct, they often are referring
to the prosecutor's unfair closing argument.'I3
As with other types of courtroom behavior, a prosecutor's closing
argument is circumscribed by various constitutional and ethical
requirements. A prosecutor must not misstate the evidence or mislead
the jut-y.'I4 A prosecutor must not express her personal belief in the
truthfulness of her witnesses or the guilt of the defendant.Il5 A
prosecutor must not make arguments that inflame the passions and
prejudices of the jury.'I6 Moreover, a prosecutor, more than any other
lawyer, must be especially careful to avoid misconduct because as a
prosecutor well knows, her comments carry the imprimatur of the
government and therefore carry greater weight with a jury that is more
likely to respect the prosecutor's judgment and have confidence in her
109. Rogers v. State, 721 P.2d 805, 808 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
1 10. Id.
I l I . 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
112. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
1 13. See GERSHMAN,
supra note 60, at 3 1 1 :1.
1 14. Id. at 5 l l:27;ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note 10,
,

5 3-5.8(a)
("prosecutor should not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the
inferences it may draw").
1 15. See GERSHMAN,
supra note 60, 5 1 1 :2 1 ; ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra
note 10, 5 3-5.8(b) ("The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or
opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the
defendant.").
1 16. GERSHMAN,
supra note 60, 5 1 1:2; ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note
10, 8 305.8(c) ("The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the
prejudices of the jury").
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assertions."' The prosecutor's standing with the jury may have an even
greater impact when the prosecutor analyzes the scientific evidence.
Because such evidence is technical and difficult for lay jurors to
understand and evaluate, a prosecutor's discussion of such evidence
provides a powerful opportunity to mislead and prejudice the jury.
A vivid example of a prosecutor's misconduct during closing
argument occurred in the notorious "Central Park Jogger" case, in which
five teenagers were convicted in 1990 of beating and raping a jogger in
Central Park, New ~ 0 r k . I The
' ~ evidence at trial consisted of videotaped
confessions by each defendant, corroborated by scientific evidence
establishing that hairs from the victim were found on one of the suspects.
The convictions were vacated earlier this year after DNA tests showed
that the hairs did not come from the victim, and that the defendants'
confessions were false.lI9
Apart from the contested confessions, the only items of physical
evidence offered by the prosecution that directly linked any of the
teenagers to the crime were four strands of hair attributed to the victim
and recovered from the clothing of two of the suspects.Iz0 A scientific
expert testified for the prosecution that the hairs found on the suspects
were "consistent with" and "similar to" hairs of the v i ~ t i m . ' ~However,
'
in her closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor used a far different
characterization of the hair evidence. The prosecutor asserted that the
hair evidence found on defendant Kevin Richardson's underpants
"matched the head hair of the victim."'22 The prosecutor further argued
that a second hair on the defendant's T-shirt "matched' the victim's
pubic hair.Iz3 The prosecutor then vouched for the reliability of the
contested confessions by asserting that the defendant "got those hairs
when he was with" the victim. The prosecutor concluded, "And it was
because he was touching her, because he came in contact with her and

117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

118. See People v. Salaam, 629 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Wise, 612
N.Y .S.2d 1 17 (N.Y. App. 1994); People v. Richardson, 608 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. App.
1994); People v. McCray, 604 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. App. 1993).
119. People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
120. Jim Dwyer & Susan Saulny, Hair Evidence in Jogger Case is Discredited, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2002, at B I .
121. Id.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. (emphasisadded).
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with her clothes and when he was on top of her and around her, that's
how he got her hair on his lo thing."'^^
Clearly, the pressure to win a high profile trial caused this
experienced prosecutor to make a false and inflammatory argument.
Experienced prosecutors are aware that microscopic hair comparisons are
highly subjective and scientifically unreliable. Moreover, in view of
subsequent published remarks made by her expert, the prosecutor in the
Central Park Jogger case had to know of the general consensus in the
scientific community against using the expression that hair "matches,"
and almost certainly was so informed by her expert witness.Iz5 To be
sure, hair comparisons have produced among the worst results in
proficiency tests of crime laboratories across the ~ 0 u n t r y . I ~Hair
~
evidence has been a factor in about one-third of the 111 cases of
wrongful convictions that have been reversed following DNA tests.'27 In
fact, because hair comparison is so unreliable, some courts have even
excluded hair comparison testimony entirely, concluding that such
testimony is unduly speculative, and that the probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.Iz8
Prosecutors nevertheless employ this rnischaracterization when
arguing to the jury, often without interference by the trial judge. Even
appellate courts are led astray by the prosecutors' mischaracterizations.
In Williamson v. state,'" as in the Central Park Jogger case, the expert's
testimony that hairs were "microscopically consistent" elicited the
prosecutor's closing argument: "There's a match."'30 Indeed, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied on the prosecutor's
mischaracterization, stating in its opinion: "Hair evidence placed
[defendant] at the decedent's apartment."I3' Clearly, if trial and appellate
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. See also Dwyer & Saulny, supra

note 120 (Nicholas Petrarca, a scientific expert who testified for the prosecution at the
"Jogger" trial, stated in a recent interview that "he was often pushed by lawyers to
declare something was or was not a match, but that he has always resisted such pressure."
"[Ilit was a strict practice in the police laboratory to avoid declaring a match." "No one
ever says 'match."').
126. See DWYER
ET AL., supra note 5, at 62-63.
127. Id. at 263. See also Dwyer & Saulny, supra note 120.
128. See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995); United
States v. Hutching, No. CR-92-32-S (E.D. Okla. 1993).
129. 8 12 P.2d 384 (Okla. Crim. App. 199 1).
130. Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1557.
13 1 . Williamson, 8 12 P.2d at 397. See also People v. Richardson, 608 N.Y.S.2d 627,
628 (N.Y. App. 1994) (court refers implicitly to the forensic hair evidence by stating that
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courts as well as juries can be misled by a prosecutor's irresponsible
closing argument, the integrity of the fact-finding process is even further
compromised.
V. USINGSCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
RESPONSIBLY
To protect the integrity of the criminal fact-finding process and the
accuracy of determinations of guilt and punishment from fraudulent and
erroneous scientific evidence, courts, legislatures, and prosecutors need
to focus first on improving the quality and independence of scientific
forensic laboratories; second, improving the quality and independence of
scientific forensic experts; and third, improving the ethics and integrity
of prosecutors in using scientific evidence responsibly in the service of
truth rather than merely winning convictions. Several scientific forensic
crime laboratories recently have been discredited for incompetence and
dishonesty, including the FBI,'32 Ho~ston,"~West virginia,I3"
M~ntana,"~
and Oklahoma City.'3"ontributing
factors have included
the absence of quality control procedures, poorly trained and
unsupervised examiners, no systematic methods for laboratory
accreditation, no systematic or rigorous blind proficiency testing, and no
random external scientific audits. In addition, many of these laboratories
are part of police agencies and invested with a police officer's mindset of
solving crimes rather than a scientist's mindset of finding the truth.
Since prosecutors use the resulting evidence to charge and convict,
and are responsible for the integrity of the proof, they should reasonably
take the lead in supporting the creation of independent scientific forensic
laboratories, separated from police agencies and police supervision,
operated by civilian personnel, with a sufficient budget to provide up-todate facilities for DNA testing, and the capacity to train forensic
scientists in DNA testing and e ~ a l u a t i o n . ' ~Such
~
laboratories also
"there was substantial evidence that defendant was one of the youths responsible for
nearly killing the victim").
132. See David Johnston, Report Criticizes Scientific Testing at F.B.I. Crime Lab,
N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 16, 1997, at A6.
133. See Nick Madigan, Houston's Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 9,2003, section I at 20.
134. See In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501
(W. Va. 1993).
135. See Liptak, supru note 89.
136. See Boshell, supra note 4 9 and accompanying text.
COMMISSION
ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT,
STATEOF ILL.,
137. See REPORT,GOVERNOR'S
at 5 1-63 (2002); Feldman, supra note 6 , at 698-703.
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should establish quality control procedures to monitor the integrity of
methods and accuracy of results.
In addition, as many recent scandals amply show, the quality and
independence of scientific forensic examiners need to be improved.
Prosecutors, who rely on these experts as witnesses and who are legally
responsible for their mistakes and misconduct, again should take the
lead. Many scientific experts too often think of themselves as police
officials rather than as scientist^."^ Even those scientific forensic
examiners not affiliated with police agencies too often exaggerate or
misstate their findings in order to support the prosecutor's theory. Some
of these experts are in a position where they can manufacture evidence,
and evidence suggests that some of them have done precisely that.'39
Courts also must be increasingly vigilant to exclude evidence that does
not have a valid scientific basis and to preclude experts who exaggerate
5
the value of their findings.I4O
Finally, proper use of scientific evidence requires above all that
prosecutors act responsibly in their dual roles as advocates to convict the
guilty as well as ministers of justice to prevent the wrongful conviction
of innocent person^.'^' Sanctions to deter misconduct by prosecutors are
severely limited. The only realistic sanction faced by a prosecutor who
commits misconduct is the possibility of the conviction being reversed.
However, as prosecutors well know, even the possibility of reversal is
becoming increasingly remote due to the broad availability of
conviction-preserving doctrines such as the harmless error rule and
judicial and statutory limitations on habeas corpus review.'42 Personal
sanctions against a prosecutor for deliberate misconduct, such as civil
liability and professional discipline, almost never happens.I4' The
establishment of professional disciplinary commissions solely to oversee
conduct by prosecutors, much like commissions that review conduct by
judges, although a viable consideration, is unlikely.'*
There are other ways to improve the integrity of the fact-finding
process. Trial and appellate courts should supervise more closely the
138. See Giannelli supra notes 72, 85-87 and accompanying text.
139. See Giannelli, supra note 72, at 442-62.
140. See, e.g., Williamson v . Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
141. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
142. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate is Open But the Door is Locked-Habeas
Corpus and Harmless Error, 5 1 WASH.& LEEL. REV. 1 15 (1 994).
supra note 60, at 55 14:12 - 14: 13.
143. See GERSHMAN,
144. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New prosecutor.^, 53 U . PIIT. L. REV.393,453-55
( 1992).
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prosecutor's conduct in pre-trial disclosure and discovery. There have
been extensive reports of serious abuses by prosecutors in concealing
from the defense favorable material evidence, and in violating discovery
orders.'45 Nondisclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence may
be the most serious obstacle to the ascertainment of truth in a criminal
Although statutes typically require timely discovery to the
defense of scientific evidence, this mandate is easily evaded.
Information is disclosed that contains insufficient data to assist the
defense, or arrives too late for effective use.I4'
Moreover, standards should be established that require prosecutors
who use scientific evidence, particularly in capital cases, to be trained
and supervised in their handling of such proof. Standards can be
established by courts, legislatures, or even within prosecutors' offices by
establishing protocols for using forensic experts and forensic evidence.
Prosecutors' offices should develop office policies and incorporate these
policies into office manuals.
Standards and protocols should also be established with respect to
the preservation of scientific evidence. As noted above, too often such
evidence is routinely de~troyed.'~'In addition, prosecutors should be
willing to examine post-conviction claims of innocence that might be
established by DNA evidence.'49 Many prosecutors, by agreeing to new
tests, demonstrate a commitment to truth and avoidance of a wrongful
c o n v i ~ t i o n . However,
'~~
too many prosecutors refuse to allow such tests.
Courts and legislatures should enact rules requiring post-conviction DNA
testing if prosecutors demonstrate an unwillingness to consider such
proof. '
145. See, e.g.. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors
Sacrifice Justice To Win, CHIC.TRIB.,Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (extensive study documenting
convictions in 381 homicide cases nationwide that were reversed because prosecutors
concealed evidence of defendants' innocence or knowingly presented false evidence).
146. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM
URB.L.J. 607,619 (1999).
147. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
148. See Boshell, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
149. See Ross E. Milloy, A Texas Prosecutor Who Seeks Evidence of Innocence, N.Y.
TIMES,Oct. 2 1,2000, at A9.
150. See, James Sterngold, Sun Diego District Attorney Offering Free DNA Testing,
N.Y. TIMES,July 28, 2000, at A12. (The New York County District Attorney asked the
court to vacate the convictions in the Central Park Jogger case after concluding that the
convictions were based on false confessions.) See also People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837
(N.Y. Sup. 2002).
151. See S. Doc. No. 2073, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposed legislation that would
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Finally, to meet his constitutional and ethical obligations in using
scientific evidence, a responsible prosecutor should always be guided by
three precepts.'52 First, a prosecutor should examine the scientific
evidence with a healthy skepticism developed through education,
training, and experience. Second, a prosecutor should be willing to
subject the evidence to rigorous testing and re-e~aminati0n.I~~
Third, a
prosecutor should have the courage to decline prosecution if he entertains
a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
VI. CONCLUSION
A prosecutor's use of scientific evidence occurs in every stage of the
adjudicative process, including pre-trial disclosure and discovery,
presentation of witnesses and evidence, and closing arguments to the
jury.
A prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence may violate
constitutional, statutory, and ethical rules governing the prosecutor's
conduct. Moreover, given the technical and complex nature of forensic
evidence, and the prosecutor's standing with the jury, the opportunity for
a prosecutor bent on winning a conviction to misuse scientific evidence
is considerable. Abuse occurs when a prosecutor suppresses or discloses
too late for effective use relevant scientific evidence; elicits testimony
from her scientific forensic expert that is fraudulent or erroneous; or
improperly bolsters that testimony; or makes arguments to the jury that
are false, misleading, or inflammatory.
Improving the integrity of scientific evidence requires establishing
scientific forensic laboratories that are independent of law enforcement
agencies and that maintain rigorous quality control procedures;
improving the training and supervision of the experts who examine the
evidence and testify in court; and requiring training, supervision, and
protocols for prosecutors in the use of scientific evidence to ensure that
the integrity of the fact-finding process is not tainted by fraudulent or
erroneous scientific proof.

mandate free DNA testing on application of convicted defendant o f any biological
material in government's possession related to the prosecution).
152. See Gershman, supra note I I , at 342-5 1.
153. See Andrew Jacobs & Marc Santora, New Report in Wife's Death Clears Former
Dec. 5, 2002, at B1 (prosecutor dismisses murder charges
Police OfJicer, N.Y. TIMES,
that were based initially on pathologist's erroneous conclusion after independent experts
demonstrated that death was caused accidentally).
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